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prived of personality, but embodies all the conditions of personality. In fact if you hold to that statement I think you must give in to me about the consciousness of God; for I maintain that consciousness is one of the conditions of personality—in fact the chief condition.

I agree that God is not *a* God; he is God. But when I say that he is personal I do not mean that he is *a* God. Personal does not mean finite, present in one place at one time, transient. Nor does it mean merely definite in character. Rocks and stones are definite in character. The meaning of the word person is to me a being of a definite æsthetic character—a being possessed of definite feeling—definite mind. Such is God. And such, to a less degree is man. We are imperfect persons. Our characters are not so very definite, not crystallised, not solidified. We are changeable. A person of what is called strong personality is less changeable. But God is the perfect person.

And not only do you allow us no real existent Brahma to look up to, but nothing lasting to look forward to—nothing but final absorption into the lower state whence we came. *God* is immortal—the universe is immortal—of course it is; we all know that. But *we* are all to die. We stand on the summit of evolution with the certain knowledge that in the progress (?) of years every one of our kind on this planet will be as if they never had been. It is sound enough morality, as far as it goes, to say we should all live for each other. But it is the hollowest, shallowest, and most utterly illogical philosophy to seek in that idea an explanation of the problem of life. Why have we been evolved as individuals, why all the pain, what is attained—if we are all to be at last wiped out? I live for you, and you for me; but the problem of life is still unsolved. You are preaching a bankrupt philosophy—a philosophy with the bottom knocked out of it. How much longer are you going on imagining that you find satisfaction in it?

And what about our aspirations for a wider life outside this little globe in space? There is life like ours in other planets. But that is not much satisfaction to us if we are never to have any direct connexion with it. And the same is true of every inhabitant of every lonely planet. Are none of us ever to know our neighbors. You have no big plan of the universe to offer us, in which each planet fulfils its necessary part and has its own especial *raison d'être*. What are they for, these planets? There are those of us who seem to have learnt the lessons of the life here on this planet. We can take a broad survey of the whole of it, what it is and what it would seem to lead to. We have gone through the school and reached the highest form. Is there no outer wider life into which we can pass? Nothing but the certain knowledge of that final death which is—somewhen—to overwhelm our little planet and all in it?

W. E. AYTON. WILKINSON.

EDITORIAL REMARKS ON MR. WILKINSON'S ARTICLE.

There are a great number of people who are bound to have a God that is like themselves, an individual being possessed of an ego consciousness, with sentiments

like ours and pursuing plans of his own, which would render his nature a case of exact analogy to our own mental make-up. Mr. Wilkinson is one of them, and his plea for God as possessed of an ego consciousness with an individual organisation is very forcible and impressive. But after all, his theory proves untenable and will only reveal the weak points of anthropotheism, i. e., of that view of God which looks upon God as an ego consciousness, having definite feelings, endowed with knowledge, thinking successive thoughts as we do, and finally arriving at a decision to be carried into effect.

Mr. Wilkinson rightly combats the psychology of the late Professor Huxley who held that consciousness, being a mere spectator, is of no consequence; but he is mistaken when he thinks that consciousness can be regarded as a force, as a cause of motion. The tangled skein of errors can be unravelled by pointing out the truth from which his thoughts start and by searching for the fallacy on which they switch off into the assumption of a metaphysical *primum movens*.

We perfectly agree with Mr. Wilkinson that:

"All motion is either directly or indirectly associated with consciousness."

His arguments, however, become unclear when he speaks of force. He says:

"The idea of force as a connecting link between the two ideas of consciousness and motion somewhat assists us in imagining the association of the two."

Force is defined as "something that could cause motion," and then "consciousness is defined as a force." Mr. Wilkinson says:

"A conscious being or soul exerts will-force and thereby causes matter to move."

We would represent the facts as follows: Consciousness is a term denoting the awareness of certain states of our own existence, and motion means a change of place. Force is measured in terms of motion and mass, being conceived as the state of strain or stress that does or can induce motion. The "force" of a body in motion, as the term is popularly used, is called kinetic energy, the "force" of a body at rest and under a stress is called potential energy. Consciousness, being a state of awareness, is neither potential nor kinetic energy, it is no force at all, but it is simple awareness, a phenomenon of quite a different order. It is no mechanical phenomenon but a psychical condition which is commonly called feeling.

Mr. Wilkinson's mistake consists in confusing two abstractions of a different order. Consciousness is a phenomenon belonging to the subjective phases of our experience, while motion is an objective phenomenon. Feelings can be felt only by the feeling of feelings; and this feeling of feelings is the condition of our self-awareness. Feelings find expression in motions, and these motions can be watched, but the feelings themselves, feelings as feelings, are purely subjective; they cannot be seen, or observed by others. We have good reasons to believe that every feeling is the psychical accompaniment of a definite kind of a brain-motion, and we might, at least in theory, be able to know which brain-motion represents pain, which joy, which calm thoughts, and which any other kind of sentiment. But even then if we

inspected the machinery of the brain, it would be impossible to see feelings; we should see motions only, we should be confronted solely with objective phenomena; we should see no feelings, no sentiments, no joys, no pains, for they are purely subjective. Now we assume, according to the monistic doctrine which is commonly accepted by scientists, that matter, motion, consciousness are abstractions from reality, and not things in themselves, that things possess many qualities, they are material, they are active, i. e., they exhibit mechanical phenomena, and sometimes they are sentient, and the subjective side of sentiency is an exact counterpart of the observable objective phenomena.

Two mistakes have been made by philosophers, they have treated abstract notions as separate beings and believe that there are feelings which exist in ghostlike independence, or they identify the various abstractions where they are found in connexion, and call thoughts brain-motions, imagining that thoughts consist either of matter or are purely mechanical phenomena. The actual state of things is this: While an idea is being thought, the brain is in a state of activity. The idea consists in the significance of a sentiment. The sentiment is the subjective aspect of that which objectively considered is a cerebral motion.

The motion of the brain indicates that a commotion of the soul takes place, the significance of which exactly tallies with the form of the nervous excitement.

After these explanations it is apparent that the mechanical order of things remains continuous and is not interrupted by consciousness as a cause of motion; and yet consciousness is not, for that reason, an irrelevant factor in the world.

We must bear in mind that causation (least of all mental) does not depend upon the amount of mechanical motion but upon its form. A lock is opened not by force but by the right key which fits to the keyhole and lifts the lever. In a similar way, ideas find response in the minds of the people addressed. They are communicated by very simple mechanical means, viz., by air-sounds, called words, the significance of which is the same to all who know the language. Let us illustrate this in the instance pictured in a poetic *genre* picture of Lenau, who portrays the carousal of banditti in an inn of the Hungarian Pusta. Gypsies play the fiddle, some bandits dance, others drink, and the captain watches. But now his ear perceives the trot of distant horses, indicating the approach of soldiers. He gives the signal of alarm, and the noise of the revelling banditti is hushed. They take to their horses and disappear in the darkness of the Pusta. The concatenation of cause and effect is throughout as mechanical as are the motions of a machine, but the efficiency of the signal depends upon its significance which is constituted by all the recollections connected with the word. The mental element, i. e., the significance of words, is not a force that creates energy but is the meaning of the air-sounds, and this meaning wherever understood consists in a state of mind which imparts direction to the energy stored up in brain and muscle. It is not a motion or cause of motion, but corresponds to the form of the key and the lock. The speaking of a word and the listening to it takes a very small amount of energy, but

the significance of the words which is the reason why the words find response depends upon a definite form and is not a force, yet it may be accessory in stirring the energy of a whole nation and all its various dynamic resources of steam-engines and the gun powder of its artillery. Thus the mechanical energy of a spark is insignificant, while the explosion of a powder magazine is exorbitant, yet as the spark does not produce the mechanical energy which it sets free, so an idea does not create the energy to which it gives a new direction.

Ideas which loom up in the consciousness of men are not forces, and consciousness is the subjective aspect of a brain commotion, but for that reason ideas, far from being irrelevant, are the most important realities of life, and consciousness is the reflector in which they are actualised

So much to correct Mr. Wilkinson's view as to the shortcomings of the scientific conception of consciousness and his own theory which assumes that consciousness is capable of originating motion. I might proceed further and show how an idea depends on the form of a sensation or sentiment and not on the atoms in which it is thought; that the continuity of man's personality results from a preservation of form and not from an identity of any substance, and finally, that a reproduction of form means a rebirth of soul, for form is not a nonentity but the all-important factor of the world. Form in itself is the essential condition of things spiritual, and that continuity of form is a reality even in the flux of matter is proved by the continuity of consciousness which is preserved in spite of the constant metabolism of the body. Memory is a preservation of form, and we know ourselves to remain the same although all material particles of our body have changed, and we are obliged to renew constantly the supply of the sources of our energy needed for the sustenance of life. But we cannot discuss these subjects without writing a long essay on psychology. The main question at present is whether or not God is an individual being, a concrete ego-soul of the world, an *anima mundi*, thinking successive thoughts as we do and arriving at decisions like ours in every respect, except that he is greater, wiser, and infinitely more powerful than a man.

The existence of such a world-soul is not very probable, although I am not prepared to say that it is impossible, but granted that it existed, I should not confer on it the name God. The mere thought of it is sufficient for refutation. This world-soul would be an individual creature subject to evolution, conditioned by the eternal laws of existence and bound to respect the unalterable principles of right and wrong. This world-soul, taking now for argument's sake its existence for granted, has apparently enough to do in keeping the whole body of the universe in a state of health and cannot trouble itself about the personal welfare of the innumerable smaller beings that people the various limbs of his organism as bacilli inhabit a human being. The best argument that speaks in favor of this conception of an individual world-soul-god is the discovery of organisms smaller than we ourselves in our own system:

"For little fleas have lesser fleas
 Upon their back to bite 'em,
 And lesser fleas still lesser fleas
 And so *ad infinitum*."

But what comfort can the flea derive from the idea that the world which he inhabits is as much an organism as he himself? Both, after all, are creatures, and neither is a God. An All-being would be an enormously big creature, still it would be a creature subject to error, failure, disappointment, sin, and suffering as much as any minor creature that lives in its bowels.

I do not wish to repeat myself in this reply to Mr. Wilkinson's criticism, especially as the last number of *The Monist* contains an article of mine on the same subject. I would only request the reader to bear in mind, first, that law is a convenient but in certain respects a misleading term, for those eternal uniformities which constitute the cosmic order; secondly, that these uniformities appear in their scientific formulation very dry and abstract, but in reality they are effective realities whose life is not like that of organisms subject to origin and decay, but everlasting and immutable. If they are said to be omnipresent, it means that they are here and everywhere, omnipresence does not mean that they are nowhere. Thirdly, we should mind that those eternal norms of right, of truthfulness, of purity of heart, are not less real than are the laws of gravitation. Fourthly, this omnipresence of God should not be interpreted in the sense of the old-fashioned pantheism which identifies God and the world. Although God and the world are separate, they are not one and the same thing; they are different. The Allhood of existence, its omnipresent formative feature is not tantamount with an All-being, i. e., the sum total of all things. Fifthly, God is not a vague generality but is possessed of a definite and well determined character. He exhibits a clearly pronounced suchness which is the ultimate standard of morality, of goodness, of right. In this sense we see a justification of the traditional dogma of the personality of God. God consists of all those features which constitute the personality of man, endowing him with rationality and moral ideals. But while we may speak of the system of divine eternalities as a person, we must insist that the personality of God does not mean individuality, for which reason we prefer to characterise God as superpersonal. His personality is of a higher kind than man's personality; it is an eternal and omnipresent personality, while man's personality is the personality of an individual being limited in time and space. Finally, consider that man is by dint of his reason a more or less perfect incarnation of the eternal in nature; he has originated in the image of God and is God as reflected in consciousness. Therefore while we may be the lineal descendants of monkeys, frogs, and amœbas, we are still the children of God. The eternal that permeates all transient phenomena has taken abode in man's soul; and this eternal which is in us constitutes our very soul. Our bodies have originated through the modification of the bodies of lower animals; but this modification has been effected through the omnipresent potencies of the eternal in

nature, of the creative and formative Deity, of the Logos that was in the Beginning.

Shall we, being more or less an incarnation of God and an actualisation of the eternal, be afraid of death? No, not when we have understood the full significance of this truth. Death dissolves our bodies; death terminates the activity of our earthly career; it does away with sufferings and all the tribulations of life. But the formal part of our being, the mould in which we have been cast, remains undestroyed.

Now, having stated my view of the situation and having pointed out some of the most flagrant mistakes of Mr. Wilkinson's conception of God, I cannot help adding a postscript in which I would urge Mr. Wilkinson to stick to his God conception so long as he is incapable of perceiving the deeper truth of a more philosophical interpretation of facts. The dogmas of religious tradition are not untrue, but expressed in parables. He who discards the parable as untrue is apt to think that it is meaningless. The babe that cannot as yet digest meat should not become dissatisfied with the milk, else it will starve. And, on the other hand, there is nothing wrong with the milk when the adult is advised to live on a more substantial diet.

P. C.

MR. LUTOSLAWSKI'S "PLATO."

Mr. Lutoslawski's reply raises a different issue from that which I intended to make in the review to which he objects. I am not concerned to deny Mr. Lutoslawski's cleverness, industry, and erudition, and I can cheerfully subscribe to many of the flattering things said by the critics whom he quotes. The true interpretation of the Platonic philosophy and the value of any given attempt at such an interpretation are perhaps matters of subjective opinion. The translation, fair paraphrase, or meaning of particular Platonic *loci* is or should be generally a matter of fact. The "fact," then, of which I spoke is that Mr. Lutoslawski positively misapprehends many Platonic passages and strains or perverts the fair meaning of very many more. In support of this contention I cited by chapter and verse a considerable number of passages. To meet my criticism Mr. Lutoslawski must show that these passages are correctly translated, or, if he prefers the expression, "interpreted" or "applied." But his answer refers to only one passage, *Timaeus* 28 A. He says that he did not intend for a translation the interpretation which he twice gives of this passage. I will not cavil on that point. The interpretation is wrong, and the passage does not tend to establish the thesis in support of which it is cited except on the wrong interpretation. Mr. Lutoslawski remembers his *Gorgias* too well to expect a Platonist to be overcome by a cloud of witnesses, especially if their testimony does not bear on the point in issue, which, I repeat, is the correctness of Mr. Lutoslawski's interpretations of specific passages. I positively affirm that his book contains many misstatements of fact and a large number of interpretations which are erroneous whether they be translations or not. I have cited several of them. It will be easy to cite more when these have been considered.

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